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Abstract—Providing proper economic incentives is essential for
the success of dynamic spectrum sharing. Cooperative spectrum
sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. In coopera-
tive spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for
primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission
time for the SUs’ own communication needs. In this paper,
we study the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete
information, where SUs’ types (capturing their heterogeneity in
relay channel gains and evaluations of power consumptions) are
private information and not known by PUs. Inspired by the
contract theory, we model the network as a labor market. The
single PU is the employer who offers a contract to the SUs.
The contract consists of a set of contract items representing
combinations of spectrum accessing time (i.e., reward) and
relaying power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and
each of them selects the best contract item to maximize his payoff.
We study the optimal contract design for both weak and strong
incomplete information scenarios. First, we provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts in both scenarios.
In the weak incomplete information scenario, we further derive
the optimal contract that achieves the same maximum PU’s
utility as in the complete information benchmark. In the strong
incomplete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-and-
Compare algorithm that achieves a close-to-optimal contract.
We future show that the PU’s average utility loss due to the
suboptimal algorithm and the strong incomplete information are
both relatively small (less than 2% and 1.3%, respectively, in our
numerical results with two SU types).
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive development of wireless services and
networks, spectrum is becoming more congested and scarce.
Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising approach to increase
spectrum efficiency and alleviate spectrum scarcity, as it
enables the unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to dynamically
access the spectrum licensed to the primary users (PUs)
[1]–[4]. The successful implementation of dynamic spectrum
sharing requires many innovations in technology, economics,
and policy. In particular, it is important to design the sharing
mechanism such that PUs have incentive to open their licensed
spectrum for sharing, and SUs have incentive to utilize the new
spectrum opportunities despite of the potential costs.
Market-driven spectrum trading is a promising paradigm to
address the incentive issue in dynamic spectrum sharing. With
spectrum trading, PUs temporarily sell the spectrum to SUs
to obtain either a monetary reward or a performance improve-
ment. A particular interesting trading scheme is cooperative
spectrum sharing, where SUs relay traffics for PUs in order
to get their own share of spectrum. A brief illustration of
cooperative spectrum sharing is shown in Figure 1 on the next
page. The SUs’ transmitters (ST1 ∼ ST3) act as cooperative
relays for the PU in Phase I and Phase II (Decoding and
Forwarding), and transmit their own data in Phase III.
Researchers have only recently started to study cooperative
spectrum sharing mechanisms [31]–[34]. The prior results
all assumed complete network information, i.e., PUs know
SUs’ channel conditions, resource constraints, and costs of
transmission. This assumption is often too strong for practical
networks. In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum
sharing under incomplete information. We consider the general
case that SUs have different types based on their relay channel
gains and evaluations of power consumptions. The types are
private information, and only an SU knows his own type.
To tackle this problem, we propose a contract-based co-
operative spectrum sharing mechanism. Contract theory is an
effective tool in designing the incentive compatible mechanism
in a monopoly market under incomplete information [39].
The key idea is to offer the right contract items so that all
of the agents have the incentive to truthfully reveal their
private information. For the spectrum sharing problem, we can
imagine the network as a labor market. The PU is the employer
and offers a contract to the SUs. The contact consists of a set
of contract items, which are combinations of spectrum access
time (i.e., reward) and relay power (i.e., contribution). The
SUs are employees, and each SU selects the best contract item
according to his type. We want to design an optimal contract
that maximizes the PU’s utility (average data rate) under the
incomplete information of SUs’ types.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• New modeling and solution technique: As far as we know,
this is the first paper that tackles cooperative spectrum
sharing under incomplete information based on contract
theory.
• Multiple information scenarios: We study the optimal
contract designing in three different scenarios: complete
information (benchmark), weak incomplete information,
and strong incomplete information. In the last two in-
complete information scenarios, the PU does not know
the exact type of each SU. The difference between the
two scenarios is whether the PU knows the number of
SUs in each type (the weak scenario) or only knows the
distribution of types (the strong scenario). We will design
optimal contracts for all three scenarios.
• Sufficient and necessary condition for feasible contracts:
Under incomplete information, a contract is feasible if
and only if it satisfies the incentive-compatibility (IC)
and individually rationality (IR) for each SU. We find
necessary and sufficient conditions that satisfy both IC
and IR conditions. This discussion helps us understand
important properties of a contract and how to design
optimal contracts later.
• Optimal contract design: In the weak incomplete in-
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Fig. 1. Cooperative spectrum sharing with three phases in each time slot
TABLE I
FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS AND OPTIMALITY
Network Information Feasibility Optimality Sections inthis paper
Complete (benchmark) IR Optimal III
Weak Incomplete IC & IR Optimal IV, V
Strong Incomplete IC & IR Close-to-Optimal IV, VI
formation scenario, we derive the optimal contract that
achieves the same maximum PU’s utility as in the
complete information benchmark. In the strong incom-
plete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-
and-Compare algorithm that obtains a close-to-optimal
contract.
• Performance analysis: In the strong incomplete infor-
mation scenario, we quantify the PU’s average utility
loss due to the suboptimal algorithm (by comparing
it with the exhaustive search method) as well as the
strong incomplete information (by comparing it with the
complete information benchmark). Both kinds of losses
are are relatively small, i.e., less than 2% and 1.3% in
our numerical results with two SU types, respectively.
The key results and the corresponding section numbers in
this paper are are summarized in Table I.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we provide the system model and problem formulation. In
Section III, we propose the optimal contract under complete
information (benchmark). In Section IV, we propose the
necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts under
incomplete information. In Sections V and VI, we derive
the optimal and suboptimal contracts in weak and strong
incomplete information scenarios, respectively. We present
the numerical results in Section VII. We review the related
literatures in Section VIII and finally conclude in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a cognitive radio network with a primary
licensed user (PU) and multiple secondary unlicensed users
(SUs) as shown in Fig. 1. Each user is a dedicated transmitter-
receiver pair. The PU has the exclusive usage right of the
licensed spectrum band, but its transmission suffers from the
poor channel condition between its transmitter PT and receiver
PR. We represent M SUs by distinct transmitter-receiver pairs
{STk − SRk}Mk=1. Each SU wants to have dedicated time
to access the licensed band and transmits its own data. The
PU can employ a subset of or all SUs to relay its traffic;
the involved SUs will obtain dedicated transmission time for
their own data. The interaction between the PU and the SUs
involves three phases as in Fig. 1: Phases I and II for the
cooperative communications with a total fixed length of time
T0,
1 and Phase III for the SUs’ own transmissions. More
specifically, we have
• Phase I: In the first half of the cooperative communica-
tions (T0/2), primary transmitter PT broadcasts its data
to primary receiver PR and the involved SUs’ transmitters
(e.g., ST1, ST2 and ST3 in Fig. 1). Note that SU 4 and
SU 5 are not involved in this example.
• Phase II: In the remaining half of the cooperative com-
munications (T0/2), the involved SUs’ transmitters (STs)
decode the data received in Phase I and forward to PU’s
receiver PR simultaneously using the space-time codes
assigned by PU.2 Through proper choice of space-time
codes, SUs’ simultaneous relay signals do not interfer-
ence with each other at the primary receiver PR [36],
[37].
• Phase III: PU rewards each involved SU with a dedicated
time allocation for that SU’s own data (e.g., {tk}3k=1
for three involved SUs). SUs access the spectrum using
TDMA and do not interfere with each other.
Here we assume that each involved SU can successfully
decode PU’s data in the first phase of cooperative communi-
cations. Thus we can focus on the relay links between the STs
and PR, which are the performance bottleneck of cooperative
communications. This assumption can be relaxed if the PU
can perform an initial screening over all SUs as follows. The
PU first broadcasts a pilot signal to all SUs, and only those
SUs replying correctly can choose to accept the contract and
1The time period T0 is a constant and is determined by PU’s MAC layer
and Physical layer specifications.
2We will discuss the details of the coordination between PU and SUs in
3involve in the cooperative communications later. Notice that
the involved SUs are often the ones that are close to the
primary transmitter PT, and thus are not close to the primary
receiver PR. This explains why a PT − ST channel is often
better than the corresponding ST − PR channel.
The PU and SUs have conflicting objectives in the above
interactions. The PU wants the SUs to relay its traffic with
high power levels, which will increase the PU’s data rate but
reduce the SUs’ battery levels. An SU k wants to obtain a large
dedicated transmission time tk, which will increase the SU’s
own performance but reduce the PU’s utility (time average data
rate). In Sections II-A and II-B, we will explain in details how
the PU and SUs evaluate the trade-off between relay powers
and time allocations. In Section II-C, we propose a contract-
based framework which brings the PU and SUs together and
resolve the conflicts.
A. Primary User Model
In this subsection, we discuss how PU evaluates relay
powers and time allocations.
We first derive the PU’s achievable data rate during the
cooperative communications (i.e., Phases I and II in Fig. 1).
Let us denote the set of involved SUs asN (e.g.,N = {1, 2, 3}
in Fig. 1). The received power (at the primary receiver PR)
from SU k is pk, and the time allocation to this SU is tk.
Without loss of generality, we normalize T0 to be 1 in the rest
of the paper. Then tk can be viewed as the ratio tk/T0.
• In Phase I, PU’s transmitter broadcasts its data, and PU’s
receiver achieves a data rate (per unit time) of
Rdir = log(1 + SNRPT,PR). (1)
Rdir remains as a constant throughout the analysis.
• In Phase II, each involved SU successfully decodes PU’s
data and forwards to PU’s receiver.
Thus the PU’s total transmission rate during the cooperative
communications (Phases I and II) is ( [36])
rrelayPU =
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈N
SNRSTk,PR
)
=
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈N pk
n0
)
, (2)
where n0 is the noise power, and constant 1/2 is due to equal
partition of the cooperative communication time into Phase I
and Phase II. We can think (2) as the sum of transmission
rates of two “parallel” channels, one from the PT to PR and
the other from the set of involved SUs’ transmitters to PR.
Based on the above discussion, we next compute the PU’s
average data rate during entire time period (i.e., Phases I,
II, and III). The cooperative communications only utilizes
1/(1 +
∑
k∈N tk) fraction of the entire time period. The PU’s
objective is to maximize its utility (i.e., average transmission
rate during the entire time period) as follows
uPU =
1
1 +
∑
k∈N tk
rrelayPU (3)
=
1
1 +
∑
k∈N tk
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈N pk
n0
))
,
which is decreasing in total time allocations to SUs
(∑k∈N tk), and is increasing in the total received power from
SUs (∑k∈N pk).
We want to emphasize that the utility calculation in (3)
assumes that the PU involves at least one SU in the cooper-
ative communication. The PU can also choose to have direct
transmissions only in both Phases I and II and does not interact
with the SUs (and thus there is no Phase III). The total rate in
this direct transmission only approach is Rdir. This means that
the PU will only choose to use cooperative communications if
the utility in (3) is larger than Rdir. In the rest of the analysis,
we assume that Rdir is small such that the PU wants to use
cooperative communications. In Section VII, we will further
explain what will happen when this is not true.
B. Secondary User Model
Next we discuss how SUs evaluate relay powers {pk}k∈N
and time allocations {tk}k∈N . We want to emphasize that
the relay power is measured at the PU’s receiver, not at the
SUs’ transmitters. We consider a general model where SUs
are heterogeneous in three aspects:
• SUs have different relay channel gains between their
transmitters and the PU’s receiver (hST,PR). If an SU k
wants to reach a received power pk at the PU’s receiver,
then it needs to transmit with a power ptk = pk/hSTk,PR.
• SUs can achieve different (fixed) rates to their own
receivers (i.e., data rate rSUk over link STk−SRk) with
different (fixed) transmission power (i.e., ptSUk ).
• SUs have different cost Ck per unit transmission power.
Note that the parameters Ck, rSUk , ptSUk , and hSTk,PR are
SU k’s private information and are only known to himself.
We define an SU k’s payoff as piSUk , which is the difference
between its own transmitted data during time allocation tk in
Phase III and its cost of power consumption during Phase II
and tk in Phase III. That is,
piSUk = tkrSUk −
(
tkp
t
SUk
+
1
2
pk
hSTk,PR
)
Ck. (4)
We assume that every SU is willing to use positive trans-
mission time if it does not need to relay the PU’s traffic,
i.e., rSUk − ptSUkCk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N .
3 Notice that (4)
is increasing in time allocation tk, but is decreasing in relay
power pk.
We can further simplify (4) by multiplying both sides by
2hSTk,PR/Ck, which leads to the normalized payoff
p˜iSUk := piSUk
2hSTk,PR
Ck
=
2hSTk,PR(rSUk − Ckp
t
SUk
)
Ck
tk−pk.
(5)
Such normalization does not affect SUs’ choice among differ-
ent relay powers and time allocations. Thus it will not affect
the contract design introduced later.
To facilitate later discussions, we define an SU k’s type as
θk :=
2hSTk,PR(rSUk − CkpSUk)
Ck
> 0, (6)
which captures all private information of this SU. A large type
θk means that the SU’s own transmission is efficient (a large
3If this is not true for an SU, we can simply eliminate it from the network.
4rSUk or a small pSUk ), or it has good channel condition over
relay link STk − PR (a large channel gain hSTk−PR), or it
has a more efficient battery technology (a small Ck). With
(6), we can simplify SU ’s normalized payoff in (5) as
pik(pk, tk) := p˜iSUk = θktk − pk. (7)
which is decreasing in PU’s received power pk and increasing
in PU’s time allocation tk to SU k.
Since each SU is selfish, a type-θk SU wants to choose
relay power and time allocation to maximize its payoff in (7).
Notice that an SU can always choose not to help the PU and
thus receives zero time allocation and zero payoff (i.e., tk =
pk = 0).
C. Contract Formulation under Incomplete Information
After introducing PU’s utility in (3) and SUs’ (normalized)
payoffs in (7), we are ready to introduce the contract mecha-
nism that resolves the conflicting objectives between the PU
and SUs.
Contract theory studies how economic decision-makers con-
struct contractual arrangements, generally in the presence of
asymmetric (private) information [39]. In our case, the SUs’
types are private information, thus their types are only known
to themselves. The PU does not know the type of each SU,
and needs to design a contract to attract the SUs to participate
in cooperative communications.
To better understand the contract design in this paper, we
can imagine the PU as the employer and SUs as employees in
a labor market. The employer determines the contract, which
specifies the relationship between the employee’s performance
(i.e., received relay powers) and reward (i.e., time allocation).
If we denote P as the set of all possible relay powers and T
as the set of all possible time allocations, then the contract
specifies a t ∈ T for every p ∈ P . Each distinct power-
time association becomes a contract item. Once a contract is
given, each SU will choose the contract item that maximizes
its payoff in (7). The PU wants to optimize the contract items
to maximize its utility in (3).
We consider K types of SUs with types denoted by the set
Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θK}. Without loss of generality, we assume
that θ1 < θ2 < ... < θK . The total number of SUs in type-θk is
Nk. According to the revelation principle [38], it is enough to
consider the class of contract that enables the SUs to truthfully
reveal their types. Because of this, it is enough to design a
contract that consists K contract items, one for each type.
The contract can be written as Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k ∈ K} where
K = {1, 2, ...,K}.
We will derive the optimal contract design for three infor-
mation scenarios.
• Complete information in Section III: This is a benchmark
case, where the PU knows each SU’s type. We will
compute the maximum utility the PU can achieve in
this case, which serves as an upper-bound of the PU’s
achievable utility in the incomplete information scenarios.
• Weak incomplete information in Section V: The PU does
not know each SU’s type, but has knowledge of the
number of each type SUs in the market (i.e., Nk for type-
θk SUs). We will show that the optimal contract in this
case achieves the same maximum PU’s utility as in the
complete information benchmark.
• Strong incomplete information in Section VI: The PU only
knows the total number of SUs (N ) and the distribution
of each type, but does not know the number of each type
(Nk). The PU needs to design a contract to maximize its
expected utility.
Once the PU has determined the contract, the interactions
between the PU and SUs will follow four steps.
1) The PU broadcasts the contract Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k ∈ K}
to all SUs.
2) After receiving the contract, each SU chooses one con-
tract item that maximizes its payoff and informs the PU
its choice.
3) After receiving all SUs confirmations, the PU informs
the involved SUs (i.e., those choosing positive contract
items) the space-time codes to use in Phase II and the
transmission schedule in Phase III. Note that the length
for transmission time for each involved SU is specified
by the contract item and the PU can no longer change.
4) The communications start by following three phases in
Fig. 1.
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER COMPLETE
INFORMATION: THE BENCHMARK SCENARIO
In the complete information scenario, the PU knows the
type of each SU. We will use the maximum PU’s utility
achieved in this case as a baseline to evaluate the performance
of the proposed contracts under incomplete information in
Sections V and VI. Without loss of generality, we assume
that Nk ≥ 1 for all type k ∈ K.
As the PU knows each SU’s type, it can monitor and make
sure that each type of SUs accepts only the contract item
designed for that type. The PU needs to ensure that the SUs
have non-negative payoffs so that they are willing to accept
the contract. In other words, the contract needs to satisfy the
following individual rationality constraint.
Definition 1: (IR: Individual Rationality): A contract satis-
fies the individual rationality constraint if each type-θk SU
receives a non-negative payoff by accepting the contract item
for θk, i.e.,
θktk − pk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. (8)
We say a contract is optimal if it yields the maximum utility
for the PU under the current information scenario. Different
information scenarios may lead to different optimal contracts.
In the complete information scenario, an optimal contract
maximizes the PU’s utility as follows
max
{(pk,tk)≥0,∀k}
Rdir
2 +
1
2 log
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
Nkpk
n0
)
1 +
∑
k∈KNktk
,
subject to IR Constraints in Eq. (8).
(9)
In this paper, the vector operations are component-wise (e.g,
(pk, tk) ≥ 0 means that pk ≥ 0 and tk ≥ 0) unless specified
otherwise. Then we have the following result.
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Lemma 1: In an optimal contract with complete informa-
tion, each SU receives zero payoff by accepting the corre-
sponding contract item. In other words, tkθk = pk for any
k ∈ K.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
an optimal contract item (pk, tk) with θktk − pk > 0. Since
PU’s utility in (9) is increasing in pk and decreasing in tk,
the PU can increase its utility by decreasing tk until θktk −
pk = 0. This contradicts with the assumption that (pk, tk)
with θktk − pk > 0 belongs to an optimal contract, and thus
completes the proof.
Using Lemma 1, we can replace pk by θktk for each k ∈ K
and simplify the PU’s utility maximization problem in (9) as
max
{tk≥0,∀k}
Rdir
2 +
1
2 log
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
Nkθktk
n0
)
1 +
∑
k∈KNktk
. (10)
Theorem 1: In an optimal contract with complete informa-
tion, only the contract item for the highest type is positive and
all other contract items are zero. That is (pK , tK) > 0, and
(pk, tk) = 0 for any k < K .
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
an optimal contract item with tk > 0 for the type-θk SUs and
k < K . The total time allocation is T ′ =
∑
k∈KNktk. Then
the PU’s utility is
u1PU =
1
1 + T ′
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈K θkNktk
n0
))
.
(11)
Next, we show that given a fixed total time allocation T ′,
allocating positive time only to the highest type SUs (i.e.,
NKtK = T
′) achieves a larger utility for the PU as follows
u2PU =
1
1 + T ′
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
θKNKtK
n0
))
. (12)
This is because θKNKtK = θKT ′ in (12) and∑
k∈K θkNktk < θKT
′ in (11), thus (12) is larger than (11).
This contradicts with the optimality of the contract, and thus
completes the proof.
Intuitively, the highest type SUs can offer the most help to
the PU within the given total time allocation in Phase III.
Using Theorem 1, the optimization problem in (10) can be
simplified as
max
tK≥0
1
1 +NKtK
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
θKNKtK
n0
))
. (13)
Since NK and tK always appear as a product in (13), we can
redefine the optimization variable as t˜K = NKtK and rewrite
(13) as
max
t˜K>0
1
1 + t˜K
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
θK t˜K
n0
))
, (14)
This means the PU’s optimal utility does not depend on NK .
When NK changes, the optimal time allocation per user t∗K
changes inversely proportional to NK .
At this point, we have successfully simplified the PU’s opti-
mization problem from involving 2K variables {(pk, tk), ∀k ∈
K} in (9) to a single variable t˜K in (14).
The problem (14) is a non-convex optimization problem,
as shown in Fig. 2 for various parameters. Although it is
difficult to find a closed-form solution, we can use an efficient
one-dimensional exhaustive search algorithm to find the global
optimal solution t˜∗K [40]. We will provide numerical results
in Section VII.
IV. FEASIBLE CONTRACTS UNDER INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
In this section, we study the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a feasible contract under incomplete information.
This will help us derive optimal contracts in Sections V and
VI.
A feasible contract includes K power-time items such that
any type-θk SU prefers the contract item (pk, tk) for its type
to any other contract item. A feasible contract must satisfy
both the individual rationality (IR) constraint in Definition 1
introduced in Section III and the incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint defined next.
Definition 2: (IC: Incentive Compatibility): A contract sat-
isfies the incentive compatibility constraint if each type-θk SU
prefers to choose the contract item for θk, i.e.,
θktk − pk ≥ θktj − pj , ∀k, j ∈ K. (15)
In summary, the PU’s optimization problem is
max
{(pk,tk),∀k}
uPU ({(pk, tk), k ∈ K}), (16)
subject to θktk − pk ≥ θktj − pj , ∀k, j ∈ K,
θktk − pk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
tk ≥ 0, pk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K.
The first two constraints correspond to IC and IR, respectively.
A. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Feasibility
Next we provide several necessary and sufficient conditions
for the contract feasibility.
Proposition 1: [Necessary condition 1]: For any feasible
contract Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k}, we have pi > pj if and only
if ti > tj .
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts. First, we prove
that if pi > pj , then ti > tj . Due to the IC constraint in (15),
we have
θiti − pi ≥ θitj − pj ,
i.e.,
θi(ti − tj) ≥ pi − pj .
6Since pi > pj , we conclude
θi(ti − tj) ≥ pi − pj > 0,
and thus ti > tj .
Next we prove that if ti > tj , then pi > pj . Due to the IC
constraint in (15), we have
θjtj − pj ≥ θjti − pi,
which can be transformed to be
pi − pj ≥ θj(ti − tj).
Since ti > tj , we conclude
pi − pj ≥ θj(ti − tj) > 0,
and thus pi > pj .
Proposition 1 shows that an SU contributing more in terms
of received power at the PU receiver should receive more time
allocation, and vice versa. From Proposition 1, we have the
following corollary, saying that the same relay powers must
have the same time allocations, and vice versa.
Corollary 1: For any feasible contract Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k},
we have pi = pj if and only if ti = tj .
Proposition 2 shows the second necessary condition for
contract feasibility.
Proposition 2: [Necessary Condition 2]: For any feasible
contract Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k}, if θi > θj , then ti ≥ tj .
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
ti < tj with θi > θj . Then we have
θitj + θjti > θiti + θjtj . (17)
On the other hand, the feasible contract satisfies the IC
constraints for both type-θi and type-θj SUs, i.e.,
θiti − pi ≥ θitj − pj,
and
θjtj − pj ≥ θjti − pi.
By combining last two inequalities, we have
θiti + θjtj ≥ θitj + θjti,
which contradicts with (17). This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 shows that a higher type SU should be
allocated more transmission time. Combined with Proposition
1, we know that a higher type of SU should also contribute
more in terms of PU’s received power.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we conclude that for a feasible
contract, all power-time combination items satisfy
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pK , 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tK , (18)
with pk = pk+1 if and only if tk = tk+1.
The previous propositions help us obtain Theorem 2 as
follows.
Theorem 2: [Sufficient and Necessary Conditions]: For a
contract Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k}, it is feasible if and only if all the
following three conditions hold:
• Contd.a: 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pK and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤
... ≤ tK ;
• Contd.b: θ1t1 − p1 ≥ 0;
• Contd.c: For any k = 2, 3, ...,K ,
pk−1 + θk−1(tk − tk−1) ≤ pk ≤ pk−1 + θk(tk − tk−1).
(19)
We give the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A. The
conditions in Theorem 2 are essential to the optimal contract
design under weak and strong incomplete information in
Section V and Section VI.
V. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER WEAK
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we will look at the weak incomplete scenario
where the PU does not know each SU’s type but only knows
the number of each type (i.e., Nk for any k ∈ K). Without loss
of generality, we assume that Nk ≥ 1 for all k ∈ K. Different
from the complete information case, here the PU cannot force
an SU to accept certain contract item as the PU does not know
the SU’s type. Thus we need to consider IC constraint here
(while not in the complete information case in Section III).
A conceptually straightforward approach to derive the op-
timal contract is to solve (16) directly. Going through this
route, however, is very challenging as (16) is a non-convex
and involves complicated constraints.
Here we adopt a sequential optimization approach instead:
we first derive the best relay powers {p∗k({tk, ∀k}), ∀k} given
fixed feasible time allocations {tk, ∀k}, then derive the best
time allocations {t∗k, ∀k} for the optimal contract, and finally
show that there is no gap between the solution {(p∗k, t∗k), ∀k}
obtained from this sequential approach and the one obtained
by directly solving (16).
Proposition 3: Let Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k} be a feasible con-
tract with fixed time allocations {tk, ∀k : 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tK}.
The optimal unique relay powers satisfy
p∗1({tk, ∀k}) = θ1t1,
p∗k({tk, ∀k}) = θ1t1 +
k∑
i=2
θi(ti − ti−1), ∀k = 2, ...,K.
(20)
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B. Using
Proposition 3, we can simplify the PU’s optimization problem
in (16) as
max
{tk,∀k}
Rdir
2 +
1
2 log
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
Nk(θ1t1+
∑
k
i=1
θi(ti−ti−1))
n0
)
1 +
∑
k∈KNktk
,
(21)
subject to, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tK .
We can further simplify (21) using Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3: In an optimal contract with weak incomplete
information, only the contract item for the highest SU type
is positive and all other contract items are zero. That is
(pK , tK) > 0, and (pk, tk) = 0 for any k < K .
Using Theorem 3, we can simplify the optimization problem
in (21) further as
max
tK≥0
1
1 +NKtK
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
θKNKtK
n0
))
. (22)
Notice that (22) under weak incomplete information is the
same as (13) under complete information. We thus conclude
that our sequential optimization approach (first over {pk, ∀k}
and then over {tk, ∀k}) results in no loss in optimality, as
it achieves the same maximum utility as in the complete
information scenario.
To solve problem (22), we can use an efficient one-
dimensional exhaustive search algorithm to find the global
optimal solution t∗K . We will provide numerical results in
Section VII.
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{(pk,tk),∀k}
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
...
N−
∑K−2
i=1
ni∑
nK−1=0
Q
(n1,...,nK−1,N−
∑K−1
i=1
ni)
1 +
∑K−1
i=1 niti + (N −
∑K−1
i=1 ni)tK
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑K−1
i=1 nipi + (N −
∑K−1
i=1 ni)pK
n0
))
.(24)
max
{tk,∀k}
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
...
N−
∑K−2
i=1
ni∑
nK−1=0
Q
(n1,...,nK−1,N−
∑K−1
i=1
ni)
(
Rdir
2
+ 1
2
log
(
1 +
∑K−1
i=1
nip
∗
i
({tk,∀k})+(N−
∑K−1
i=1
ni)p
∗
K
({tk,∀k})
n0
))
1 +
∑K−1
i=1 niti + (N −
∑K−1
i=1 ni)tK
. (26)
subject to, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tK .
VI. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER STRONG
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we study the strong incomplete information
scenario, where the PU does not know each SU’s type and
even the number of each type (i.e., Nk for each k ∈ K). The
PU only knows the total number of SUs N and the probability
qk of each SU belonging to type-θk (i.e.,
∑
k∈K qk = 1).
Similar to the weak incomplete information scenario, here
the PU needs to consider the IC constraint since it cannot
force an SU to accept a certain contract item. The difference
from Section V is that here the PU does not know whether
NK = 0 or NK > 0 for the highest type-θK , and thus the
simple approach of only providing a positive contract item for
type θK as in Theorem 3 may not be optimal. If the PU does
that and it turns out that NK = 0 in a particular realization,
then there will be no SUs participating in the cooperative
communications.
The right target for the PU is design a contract to maximize
the expected utility subject to the IC and IR constraints. As
the PU knows the total number of SUs N , then the probability
density function of the number of SUs {Nk, ∀k} is
Q(n1,...,nK−1,nK=N−
∑
K−1
i=1
ni)
:= Pr(N1 = n1, ..., NK−1 = nK−1, NK = N −
K−1∑
i=1
Ni)
=
N !
n1!...nK−1!(N −
∑K−1
i=1 ni)!
qn11 ...q
nK−1
K−1 q
N−
∑
K−1
i=1
ni
K .
(23)
The PU’s optimization problem can be written in (24) subject
to the IC ad IR constraints.
Similar to Section V, here we adopt a sequential opti-
mization approach: we first derive the optimal relay pow-
ers {p∗k({tk, ∀k}), ∀k} with fixed feasible time allocations
{tk, ∀k}, then derive the optimal time allocations {t∗k, ∀k} for
the optimal contract. The difference is that optimality is no
longer guaranteed here as explained later.
Proposition 4: Let Φ = {(pk, tk), ∀k} be a feasible con-
tract with fixed time allocations {tk, ∀k : 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tK},
then the unique optimal relay powers satisfy
p∗1({tk, ∀k}) = θ1t1,
p∗k({tk, ∀k}) = θ1t1 +
k∑
i=2
θi(ti − ti−1), ∀k = 2, ...,K. (25)
Notice that Proposition 4 under strong incomplete infor-
mation is actually the same as Proposition 3 under weak
incomplete information. Proposition 4 can be proved in a
similar manner as Proposition 3, using the fact that PU’s
expected utility is increasing in {pk, ∀k}. The proof is given
in Appendix D. Based on Proposition 4, we can simplify the
PU’s optimization problem in (24) as (26).
Note that (26) is a non-convex optimization problem and all
K variables are coupled in the objective function. Furthermore,
the number of terms in the objective increases exponentially
with the number of types K . Thus it is hard to solve efficiently.
Next, we propose a low computation complexity approxi-
mate algorithm, Decompose-and-Compare algorithm, to com-
pute a close-to-optimal solution to (26) efficiently. In this
algorithm, we will compare K simple candidate contracts, and
pick the one that yields the largest utility for the PU. There
are two key ideas behind this heuristic algorithm.
• One positive contract item per contract: In each of the K
individually optimized candidate contracts, there is only
one positive contract item (for one or more types). For the
contract item in the kth candidate contract, this positive
contract item is offered to SUs with types equal to or
larger than type-θk. In other words, optimization of each
candidate contract only involves a scalar optimization,
instead of K variables as in (26).
• A balance between efficiency and uncertainty: Among K
optimized candidate contracts, we will pick the best one
that achieves the best trade-off between efficiency and
uncertainty (i.e., maximizing the PU’s expected utility).
Under strong incomplete information, it is not clear which
type is the highest among all SUs existing in a particular
network realization. If a candidate contract offers the
same positive contract item for types equal to or larger
than θk, then all SUs in these types will choose to
accept that contract item. The corresponding SU’s payoff
is increasing in type, i.e., a type θk SU receives zero
payoff and a type-θK SU receives the maximum payoff.
Thus choosing a candidate contract with a threshold θk
too low will give too much payoffs to the SUs (and
thus reduce the PU’s expected utility), but choosing a
candidate contract with a threshold too high might lead
to the undesirable case that no SUs will be able to
participate. This requires us to examine all possibilities
(i.e., K candidate contracts) and pick the one with the
best performance.
The Decompose-and-Compare algorithm is as follows.
1) Decomposition: We construct the K candidate contracts
as follows. For the kth candidate contract,
• Only offers the same contract item tk > 0 to SUs
with a type equal to or larger than type θk, and zero
for the rest of the tyes.
• Computes the optimal t∗k that maximizes PU’s ex-
pected utility in (26).
82) Comparison: After determining the above K contract
candidates, we choose the one that gives PU the highest
expected utility.
In Section VII, we will use numerical results to show that
the proposed Decompose-and-Compare algorithm achieves a
performance very close to the optimal solution to (26) in most
cases.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we use numerical results to show how the PU designs
the optimal contract in different information scenarios.
A. Complete and Weak Incomplete Information Scenarios
As shown in Section III and Section V, the optimal contract
is the same for complete and weak incomplete information
scenarios. By examining the PU’s optimization in (22) that
applies to both scenarios, we have the following observations.
Observation 1: The PU’s optimal utility increases in the
highest SU type-θK and the PU’s direct transmission rate Rdir.
Figure 3 shows PU’s utility achieved under the optimal con-
tract, which is increasing in both θK and direct transmission
rate Rdir.4 The dotted baseline denotes the rate Rdir achieved
by direct transmission only. As Rdir increases, the PU has
less incentive to share spectrum with the SUs. When Rdir
is very large, the PU chooses not to use SUs at all, which
corresponds to No Relay Region in Fig. 3 (where the three
curves with different θK’s are below the baseline).
For the rest of the numerical results, we will only examine
the PU’s choice of optimal contract, without reiterating the
need to compare with Rdir and choose direct transmission
only if needed.
Observation 2: Figure 4 shows that the PU’s optimal total
time allocation to the highest type-θK SUs, NKt∗K , decreases
in PU’s direct transmission rate Rdir. When direct trans-
mission rate is zero (i.e., Rdir = 0), the PU’s optimal
total time allocation is strictly decreasing in θK ; when direct
transmission rate is positive (i.e., Rdir > 0), the total time
allocation first increases in θK and then decreases in θK .
When direct transmission rate Rdir = 0, the PU can only
rely on SUs for transmissions and will always allocate positive
transmission time to the highest type-θK SUs. If we look
at the PU’s utility in (22) with Rdir = 0, the logarithmic
term log(1 + θNKt∗K) plays a more important role than PU’s
transmission time ratio 11+NKt∗K in this case. When θK is
small, the PU needs to allocate a large amount time to the
SUs to achieve its desirable rate. When θK becomes large, the
PU can reach a high relay rate by allocating less transmission
time to the SUs. This explains why we observe a decrease
of NKt∗K in θK . Appendix E provides a rigorous proof of
Observation 2 under Rdir = 0.
When direct transmission rate Rdir > 0 (the lower three
curves in Fig. 4), the PU has less incentive to allocate
transmission time to the SUs especially when the highest SU
type-θK is small. As θK becomes large, PU is willing to
4Without loss of generality, we can normalize n0 to be 1 in the rest of this
paper. Then θk can be viewed as the ratio θk/n0.
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Fig. 4. PU’s optimal total time allocation NKt∗K as a function of the PU’s
direct transmission rate Rdir and the highest type θK .
allocate more time in exchange of efficient help from SUs.
As θK becomes very large, the PU only needs to allocate a
small amount of time to the SUs in order to obtain enough
relay help. The above analysis together explain why the lower
three curves in Fig. 4 first increase and then decrease in θK .
B. Strong Incomplete Information Scenario
Here we show how PU chooses the optimal contract to
maximize its expected utility. As a performance benchmark,
we first compute the optimal solution to the PU’s expected
utility maximization problem in (26) via a K-dimension ex-
haustive search. We denote the corresponding optimal solution
as E[uPU ]
∗
. Notice that E[uPU ]∗ is often smaller than the
maximum utility achieved under complete information. The
performance gap is due to the strong incomplete information.
Next, we will compare the PU’s expected utility achieved
by the proposed Decompose-and-Compare algorithm with
E[uPU ]
∗
.
For illustration purposes, we consider only two types of
SUs: θ1 < θ2. The PU only knows the total number of SUs N
and the probabilities q1 and q2 of two types with q1+ q2 = 1.
In the Decompose-and-Compare algorithm, we first consider
two candidate contracts. The first candidate contract optimizes
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the same positive contract item t1 = t2 > 0 for both types. The
PU’s corresponding maximum expected utility is E[uPU ]1−2.
The second candidate contract optimizes the positive contract
item t2 > 0 and chooses t1 = 0. The PU’s corresponding
maximum expected utility is E[uPU ]2. Then we pick the
candidate contract that leads to a larger PU’s expected utility
as the solution of the Decompose-and-Compare algorithm.
To evaluate the performance of this approximate algorithm,
we consider two different parameter regimes.
1) Large qN1 : This means that the probability that all SUs
belong to the low type-θ1 is large. This happens when the total
number of SUs N is small and probability q1 is large. Figure 5
shows the PU’s expected utility obtained from the Decompose-
and-Compare algorithm (max(E[uPU ]1−2, E[uPU ]2)) and the
optimal exhaustive search method (E[uPU ]∗) as functions
of PU’s direct transmission rate Rdir. We can see that the
candidate contract that offers the same positive contract items
to both types (i.e., E[uPU ]1−2) achieves a close-to-optimal
performance with all values of Rdir simulated here. This is
because very often the PU needs to rely on the low type-θ1
SUs to relay its traffic.
We also notice that the candidate contract that offers a
positive contract item to the high type SU (i.e., E[uPU ]2)
also achieves a close-to-optimal performance (even larger than
E[uPU ]
1−2) when Rdir is large. This is because the PU with a
large Rdir relies less on the SUs, and will have more incentive
to employ only the high type SUs when they are available.
2) Small qN1 : This means that the probability that at least
one SU belongs to the high type-θ2 (i.e., 1 − qN1 ) is large.
Figure 6 shows the PU’s expected utility obtained from
Decompose-and-Compare algorithm and the optimal exhaus-
tive search method as a function of Rdir. We can see that
E[uPU ]
2 is always better than E[uPU ]1−2 and achieves a
close-to-optimal performance under all choices of Rdir. This
is because very often the PU can rely on the high type SUs
only to relay its traffic.
Observation 3: The performance of the proposed
Decompose-and-Compare algorithm achieves a close-to-
optimal performance (i.e., less than 2% according to Fig. 5
and Fig. 6) under the strong incomplete information.5
Next we study how the strong incomplete information
reduces PU’s utility comparing with the complete information
benchmark. First, we note that PU’s contract in the strong
incomplete information scenario does not depend on N1 and
N2, as the PU targets at optimizing the expected rate and does
not know the realization information. However, the actual PU’s
utility (not the expected value) does depend on N1 and N2.
Figure 7 shows the PU’s utility under different information
scenarios and different user number realizations (i.e., any
realization of N1 and N2 for a fixed N1 + N2 = N ). Here,
qN1 is small and the curve with strong incomplete information
corresponds to offering t2 > 0 and t1 = 0 (as in Fig. 6).
The (very close to) optimal contract under strong incomplete
information can be obtained by using the Decompose-and-
Compare algorithm. The optimal contract under complete
information changes as N1 and N2 change.
Observation 4: Figure 7 shows that the PU’s optimal utility
under strong incomplete information achieves the maximum
value (close to the one under complete information) when the
realized SU numbers is close to the expected value (i.e., N1 =
N2 = 6 in this example as q1 = q2 = 0.5).
In Fig. 7, the largest performance gap between the two
curves happens when N2 = 0. In this case, the optimal
contract under complete information satisfies t1 > 0 and
t2 = 0, as there are no type-θ2 users. However, the PU under
strong incomplete information chooses t1 = 0 and t2 > 0
to maximize the PU’s expected utility. Such mismatch means
that the PU under strong incomplete information has no SUs
serving as relays, and can only achieve a utility equal to half
of the direct transmission rate (only in Phase I). However, this
parameter setting only happens with a very small probability
qN1 = 0.5
12 ≈ 2.4× 10−4.
A more meaning comparison is the PU’s average utility loss
due to strong incomplete information. We can first compute
the PU’s average utility under strong incomplete information,
which is the optimal objective of the PU’s expected utility
5Due to the page limit, we only discuss two-type case here. We have similar
numerical results for cases of more than two types.
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maximization problem in (26) (via an K-dimension exhaus-
tive search). Then we can compute the PU’s average utility
under complete information by calculating the weighted sum
(weighted by the probability of each parameter (N1, N2)) of
the 13 values on the upper curve in Fig. 7. In this example,
the ratio is 0.9874. This means that the PU’s average utility
loss due to strong incomplete information is very small (i.e.,
less than 1.3%).
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. Cognitive Radio and Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
There are several comprehensive surveys on cognitive radio
and dynamic spectrum sharing [1]–[4]. Here we will only
highlight some recently proposed models. In [5], Huang et al.
proposed a distributed spectrum access scheme that enables
multiple SUs to collectively protect the PU while adapting to
changes in PU activity patterns. In [6], Xing et al. considered
dynamic spectrum sharing with quality of service guarantee for
each secondary link under interference temperature constraint.
In [7], Cao et al. introduced a distributed spectrum manage-
ment architecture, where nodes share spectrum resource fairly
by making independent actions following spectrum rules. In
[8], Mehonen et al. discussed how to precisely model spectrum
maps with spatial statistics and random fields, which is crucial
for dynamic spectrum sharing. In [9], Mehonen and Petrova
et al. further proposed a topology engine to perform the
collecting and processing of spatial information, and discussed
both technical and architectural issues in enabling such an
approach. In [10], Buddhikot discussed the potential benefits
of applying cognitive radio technologies in cellular networks.
The above results focused on the technical aspect of dynamic
spectrum sharing without considering the issue of economic
incentives.
B. Spectrum Trading for Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
Recent years have witnessed a growing body of literatures
on the economic aspect of dynamic spectrum sharing. In [11],
Pierre et al. studied the problem of how to determine the right
balance between exclusive use (typically market mechanisms
approach) and licence-exempt use of spectrum. In [12], Lehr
and Jesuale examined the economic, policy, and market chal-
lenges of enabling spectrum pooling, which is considered as
the first step toward dynamic spectrum accessing/sharing. In
[13], Chapin et al. investigated time-limited leases for inno-
vative radios such as cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum
access from both technical and policy perspectives. In [14],
Delaere and Ballon discussed the multi-level standardization
and business models for cognitive radio. In [15], Hwang et al.
discussed the feasibility of cognitive radio based network and
application scenarios from the aspects of regulation, policy
and market structure. In [16], Peha discussed policies that
can enable or facilitate the use of many spectrum-sharing
arrangements.
Market-driven spectrum trading (e.g., [17] [18]) is a promis-
ing paradigm to address the incentive issue in dynamic spec-
trum sharing. We can classify spectrum trading models into
two types: money-exchange and resource-exchange. In the
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF SPECTRUM TRADING LITERATURES
Network
Information Money-Exchange Resource-Exchange
Complete Pricing: [19]–[21] Stackelberg: [31]–[34]
Incomplete Contract: [22], [23]Auction: [24]–[30] Contract: This paper
former type, SUs pay PUs in the form of (virtual) money
for the usage of spectrum (e.g., [19]–[29]); in the latter type,
SUs provide communication resources (e.g., the transmission
power in our model) for PUs’ transmissions in exchange for
the usage of spectrum (e.g., [31]–[34]).
There has been extensive research on the money-exchange
spectrum trading model, often in the form of pricing, auction,
and contract. Pricing is often used when the seller knows
precisely the value of the resource being sold. In [19], Kloeck
et al. proposed an integrated pricing, allocating, and billing
system for cognitive radio networks. In [20], Wang et al.
proposed a joint power and spectrum allocation scheme using
a distributed pricing strategy to improve the network’s perfor-
mance. In [21], Niyato et al. proposed three different pricing
models for cognitive radio networks with different objectives.
Contract is more effective in the case where the seller only
knows limited information (e.g., distribution) of the buyers’
valuation of the resource. By motivating the buyers truthfully
reveal their private valuations, the seller can allocate the
resource to maximize its own benefit or the social efficiency.
In [22], Gao et al. proposed a quality-price contract for the
spectrum trading in a monopoly spectrum market. In [23],
Kalathil et al. proposed a contract-based spectrum sharing
mechanism to avoid possible manipulating in auction.
When the seller has no knowledge about the value of the
resource being sold, Auction becomes an effective approach.
By letting the bidders bid for the resource in a truthful manner,
the seller can efficiently allocate the resource without knowing
the value before hand. In [24], Huang et al. proposed two
divisible auction mechanisms for power allocation in spectrum
sharing to achieve efficiency and fairness, respectively. In [25],
Li et al. proposed several truthful (strategy-proof) spectrum
auction mechanisms to achieve the efficiency closed to social
optimal. In [26], Gandhi et al. proposed a real-time spectrum
auction framework to distribute spectrum among users under
interference constraints. In [27], Gao et al. proposed a multi-
shot spectrum auction mechanism to achieve social optimal
efficiency in dynamic spectrum sharing. In [28] and [29],
Zheng et al. proposed truthful single-side spectrum auction and
truthful double spectrum auction, respectively, both consider-
ing spectrum reuse among users. Wang et al. in [30] proposed
a general framework for truthful online double auction for
spectrum sharing.
Money-exchange spectrum trading is most effective when
PUs have some temporarily unused spectrum. However, when
PUs’ own demands are high or the primary channels’ ca-
pacities are low (e.g., due to shadowing and deep fading),
there will be hardly any resource left for sale. In this case,
resource-exchange spectrum trading can be a better choice.
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Cooperative spectrum sharing is an effective form of resource-
exchange spectrum trading [31]–[34], wherein PUs utilize SUs
as cooperative relays. Such cooperation can significantly im-
prove PUs’ data rate and thus can free up spectrum resources
for SUs. Existing cooperative spectrum sharing mechanisms
are usually based on Stackelberg game formulations with
complete information [31]–[34]. In this paper, we consider the
cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete information,
and propose a contract-based cooperative spectrum sharing
mechanism. As far as we know, this is the first work con-
sidering the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete
information.
We summarize the key literatures of spectrum trading in
Table II.
IX. CONCLUSION
We study the cooperative spectrum sharing between one
PU and multiple SUs, where the SUs’ types are private
information. We model the network as a monopoly market,
in which the PU offers a contract and the each SU selects
the best contract item according to his type. We study the
optimal contract designing for multiple information scenarios.
We first provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for
feasible contracts under any incomplete information. For the
weak incomplete information scenario, we derive the optimal
contract that achieves the same PU’s utility as in the complete
information benchmark. For the strong incomplete information
scenario, we propose a Decompose-and-Compare algorithm
that achieves a close-to-optimal PU’s expected utility. Both the
PU’s average utility loss due to the suboptimal algorithm and
the strong incomplete information are small in our numerical
example (less than 5% and 1.3% in our numerical results with
two SU types).
This work represents a small step towards establishing a
general framework of understanding incomplete information
in dynamic spectrum sharing. As the next step plan, we will
consider more incomplete information structures: (1) the PU
does not know the distribution of SUs’ types, and (2) each
SU knows other SUs’ types but PU does not know (a similar
setting with a different application has been studied in [35]).
We also want to understand how to design contracts in a
market with multiple PUs and multiple SUs.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Proof of sufficient conditions: We use mathematical
induction to prove this proposition. Let us denote Φ(n) as
a subset which contains the first n power-time combinations
in the complete contract Φ (i.e., Φ(n) = {(pk, tk), |k =
1, ..., n}).
We first show that Φ(1) is feasible. Since there is only one
SU type, the contract is feasible if it satisfies IR constraint in
(8). This is true due to Contd.b in Proposition 2.
We next show that if contract Φ(k) is feasible, then we
can construct the new contract Φ(k + 1) by adding new item
(pk+1, tk+1) and show that the new contract is also feasible.
To achieve this, we need to show two results:
• Result I: the IC and IR constraints for type-θk+1 SUs:{
θk+1tk+1 − pk+1 ≥ θk+1ti − pi, ∀i = 1, ..., k
θk+1tk+1 − pk+1 ≥ 0,
(27)
• Result II: for types θ1, ..., θk already contained in the
contract Φ(k), the IC constraints are still satisfied after
adding the new type θk+1:
θiti− pi ≥ θitk+1− pk+1, ∀i = 1, ..., k. (28)
Note that the new contract Φ(k + 1) will satisfy the IR
constraints of all type θ1 to θk SUs as the original contract
Φ(k) is feasible.
Proof of Result I in (27): First, we prove the IC constraint
for type θk+1. Since contract Φ(k) is feasible, the IC constraint
for a type-θi SU must hold, i.e.,
θkti − pi ≤ θktk − pk, ∀i = 1, ..., k.
Also, the right inequality of (19) in Contd.c can be trans-
formed to
pk+1 ≤ pk + θk+1(tk+1 − tk).
By combining the above two inequalities, we have
θkti−pi+pk+1 ≤ θktk+ θk+1(tk+1− tk), ∀i = 1, ..., k. (29)
Notice that θk+1 > θk and tk ≥ ti in Contd.a. We also have
θk+1tk − θk+1ti ≥ θktk − θkti.
By substituting this inequality into (29), we have
θk+1tk+1−pk+1 ≥ θk+1ti−pi, (30)
which is actually the IC constraint for type θk+1.
Next, we show the IR constraint for type θk+1. Since
θk+1 > θi for any i ≤ k, then
θk+1ti − pi > θiti − pi.
Using (30), we also have
θk+1tk+1 − pk+1 ≥ θk+1ti − pi.
By combining the last two inequalities, we have
θk+1tk+1 − pk+1 ≥ 0,
which proves the IR constraint.
Proof of Result II in (28): Since contract Φ(k) is feasible,
the IC constraint for type θi holds, i.e.,
θitk − pk ≤ θiti − pi, ∀i = 1, ..., k.
Also, we can transform the left inequality of (19) in Contd.c
to
pk + θk(tk+1 − tk) ≤ pk+1.
By combining the above two inequalities, we conclude
θitk + θk(tk+1 − tk) ≤ θiti − pi + pk+1. (31)
Note that θk ≥ θi for any i ≤ k and tk+1 ≥ tk in Contd.a.
We also have
θktk+1 − θktk ≥ θitk+1 − θitk.
By combining the above two inequalities, we conclude
θitk+1 − pk+1 ≤ θiti − pi, ∀i = 1, . . . , k
which is actually the IC constraint for type θi.
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2) Proof of necessary conditions: It is easy to check that
the sufficient conditions in Proposition 2 are also necessary
for a feasible contract. Specifically, Contd.a is the same as
necessary conditions summarized in (18). Contd.b is same as
the necessary IR constraint for the lowest type θ1 in a feasible
contract. The left inequality of Contd.c can be derived from
the necessary IC constraint for type θk−1 in a feasible contract,
and the right inequality of Contd.c can also be derived from
the necessary IC constraint for type θk.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
First, it is not difficult to check that the relay powers in
(20) satisfy the sufficient conditions of contract feasibility in
Theorem 2. We skip the details here due to the page limit.
Next we prove the optimality and uniqueness of the solu-
tions in (20).
1) Proof of optimality: We first show that the relay powers
in (20) maximize the PU’s utility given fixed time allocations,
i.e., {p∗k, ∀k} maximize
1
1 +
∑
k∈KNktk
(
Rdir
2
+
1
2
log(1+
∑
k∈KNkpk
n0
)). (32)
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that these exists another
feasible relay powers {p˜k, ∀k} which achieves a better solution
than {p∗k, ∀k} in (20). Since (32) is increasing in total relay
power, we must have
∑
k∈KNkp˜k >
∑
k∈KNkp
∗
k. Thus we
have at least one relay power p˜k > p∗k for one type θk.
If k = 1, then p˜1 > p∗1. Since p∗1 = θ1t1, then p˜1 > θ1t1.
But this violates the IR constraint for type θ1. Then we must
have k > 1.
Since {p˜k, ∀k} is feasible, then {p˜k, ∀k} must satisfy the
right inequality of Contd.c in Theorem 2. Thus we have
p˜k ≤ p˜k−1 + θk(tk − tk−1).
By substituting θk(tk − tk−1) = p∗k− p∗k−1 as in (20) into the
this inequality, we have
p˜k−1 > p
∗
k−1.
Using the above argument repeatedly, we finally obtain that
p˜1 > p
∗
1 = θ1t1,
which violates the IR constraint for type-θ1 again.
2) Proof of uniqueness: We next prove that the relay
powers in (20) is the unique solution that maximizes (32). We
also prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists another
{p¯k, ∀k} 6= {p∗k, ∀k} such that
∑
k∈KNkp¯k =
∑
k∈KNkp
∗
k
in (32). Then there is at least one relay power p¯i < p∗i and one
relay power p¯j > p∗j . We can focus on type-θj and p¯j > p∗j .
By using the same argument before, we have p¯1 > p∗1 = θ1t1.
But this violates the IR constraint for type θ1.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
an optimal contract item with tk > 0 for the type-θk SUs with
k < K . The total time allocation is T ′ =
∑
k∈KNktk in this
case. Then PU’s utility is
u1PU =
Rdir
2 +
1
2 log
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
Nk(θ1t1+
∑
k
i=2
θi(ti−ti−1))
n0
)
1 + T ′
.(33)
Next we show that given a fixed total time allocation T ′,
allocating positive time only to the highest type SUs (i.e.,
NKtK = T
′) achieves a larger utility for the PU as follows
u2PU =
Rdir
2 +
1
2 log
(
1 + θKNKtK
n0
)
1 + T ′
. (34)
This is because θKNKtK = θKT ′ in (34) and∑
k∈K
Nk(θ1t1 +
k∑
i=2
θi(ti − ti−1)) < θKT
′
in (33), thus (34) is larger than (33). This contradicts with the
optimality of the contract, and thus we completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
First, it is not difficult to check that the relay powers in
(25) satisfy the sufficient conditions of contract feasibility in
Theorem 2.
Next we prove the optimality of the solutions in (25).
1) Proof of optimality: We first show that the relay powers
in (25) maximize the PU’s expected utility given fixed time
allocations, i.e., {p∗k, ∀k} is the solution to (24). We prove
by contradiction. Suppose that these exists another feasible
relay powers {p˜k, ∀k} which achieves a better solution than
{p∗k, ∀k} in (25). Since PU’s expected utility in (24) is
increasing in total relay power, we must have
∑
k∈KNkp˜k >∑
k∈KNkp
∗
k. Thus we have at least one relay power p˜k > p∗k
for one type θk.
If k = 1, then p˜1 > p∗1. Since p∗1 = θ1t1, then p˜1 > θ1t1.
But this violates the IR constraint for type θ1. Then we must
have k > 1.
Since {p˜k, ∀k} is feasible, then {p˜k, ∀k} must satisfy the
right inequality of Contd.c in Theorem 2. Thus we have
p˜k ≤ p˜k−1 + θk(tk − tk−1).
By substituting θk(tk − tk−1) = p∗k − p∗k−1 as in (25) into the
this inequality, we have
p˜k−1 > p
∗
k−1.
Using the above argument repeatedly, we finally obtain that
p˜1 > p
∗
1 = θ1t1,
which violates the IR constraint for type-θ1 again.
2) Proof of uniqueness: We next prove that the relay
powers in (25) is the unique solution that maximizes (24). We
also prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists another
{p¯k, ∀k} 6= {p
∗
k, ∀k} such that
∑
k∈KNkp¯k =
∑
k∈KNkp
∗
k
in (24). Then there is at least one relay power p¯i < p∗i and one
relay power p¯j > p∗j . We can focus on type-θj and p¯j > p∗j .
By using the same argument before, we have p¯1 > p∗1 = θ1t1.
But this violates the IR constraint for type θ1.
E. Proof of Observation 2 for Rdir = 0
Proof. When Rdir = 0, the PU will always allocate positive
time to the highest type SUs (i.e., t∗K > 0). Its total time
allocation is decreasing in the highest type θK . PU’s utility in
(22) can be written as
uPU (tK) =
1
2(1 +NKtK)
log(1 + θKNKtK). (35)
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Denote the total time allocation to SUs as T ′. We can rewrite
(35) as a function of T ′:
uPU (T
′) =
1
2(1 + T ′)
log(1 + θKT
′),
which can be shown as a concave function of T ′. Since
t∗K > 0, we conclude that the optimal T ′∗ = NKtK∗ > 0
and satisfies
duPU (T
′)
dT ′
|T ′=T ′∗=
θK(1+T
′∗)
1+θKT ′∗
− log(1 + θKT ′∗)
2(1 + T ′∗)2
= 0,
i.e.,
F (θK , T
′∗) := θK(1+T
′∗)−(1+θKT
′∗) log(1+θKT
′∗) = 0.(36)
Since
∂F (θK , T
′∗)
∂θK
= 1− T ′∗ log(1 + θKT
′∗),
∂F (θK , T
′∗)
∂T ′∗
= −θK log(1 + θKT
′∗),
thus
dT ′∗
dθK
= −
∂F/∂θK
∂F/∂T ′∗
=
1− T ′∗ log(1 + θKT ′∗)
θK log(1 + θKT ′∗)
. (37)
Since θKT ′∗ > 0, we have
log(1 + θKT
′∗)− θKT
′∗ < 0.
By substituting this inequality into (36), we conclude
1− T ′∗ log(1 + θKT
′∗) < 0,
and thus dT ′∗
dθK
in (37) is negative. Hence, the optimal total time
allocation T ′∗ is decreasing in the highest type θK .
REFERENCES
[1] I. F. Akyildiz, W-Y Lee, M. C. Vuran and S. Mohanty, “NeXt gen-
eration/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a
survey,” Computer Networks Journal (Elsevier), vol. 50, 2006.
[2] M.M. Buddhikot, “Understanding Dynamic Spectrum Access: Models,
Taxonomy and Challenges,” in Proc. of IEEE DySPAN ’07, 2007.
[3] Y. Li, P. Mahanen, M. Buddhikot and Y. Liang, “Computer Networks
(Elsevier) Special Issue on Cognitive Wireless Networks”, Computer
Networks, pp.775-777, 2008.
[4] P.F. Marshall, “Extending the Reach of Cognitive Radio,” in Proceedings
of the IEEE, pp.612–625, 2009.
[5] S. Huang, X. Liu and Z. Ding, “Opportunistic Spectrum Access in
Cognitive Radio Networks,” in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2008.
[6] Y. Xing, C.N. Mathur, M.A. Haleem, etc., “Dynamic Spectrum Access
with QoS and Interference Temperature Constraints,” IEEE Trans. Mobile
Computing, vol. 6, no. 4, pp:423-433, Apr. 2007.
[7] L. Cao and H. Zheng, “Distributed rule-regulated spectrum sharing,” IEEE
J. Selected Areas in Comm., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 130-145, 2008.
[8] J. Riihijarvi, P. Mahonen, M. Wellens and M. Gordziel, “Characterization
and modelling of spectrum for dynamic spectrum access with spatial
statistics and random fields”, in Proc. of PIMRC ’08, pp.1-6, 2008.
[9] J. Riihijarvi, P. Mahonen, M. Petrova, V. Kolar, “Enhancing cognitive
radios with spatial statistics: From radio environment maps to topology
engine,” in Proc. of IEEE CROWNCOM ’09, pp. 1-6, 2009.
[10] M.M. Buddhikot, “Cognitive Radio, DSA and Self-X: Towards Next
Transformation in Cellular Networks (Extended Abstract)”, in Proc. of
IEEE DySPAN ’10, pp.1-5, 2010.
[11] Gary De Vries and Pierre De Vries, “The Role of Licence-Exemption in
Spectrum Reform,” Communications & Strategies 67 (2007): pp. 85-106.
[12] W. Lehr and N. Jesuale, “Spectrum Pooling for Next Generation Public
Safety Radio Systems,” in Proc. IEEE DySPAN ’08, pp:1-23, 2008.
[13] J.M. Chapin and W. Lehr, “Time-limited leases for innovative radios,”
in Proc. IEEE DySPAN ’07, pp:606-619, 2007.
[14] S. Delaere and P. Ballon, “Multi-level standardization and business
models for cognitive radio: the case of the Cognitive Pilot Channel,”
in Proc. IEEE DySPAN ’08, 2008.
[15] J. Hwang and H. Yoon, “Dynamic Spectrum Management Policy for
Cognitive Radio: An Analysis of Implementation Feasibility Issues,” un
Proc. IEEE DySPAN ’08, pp:1-9, 2008.
[16] Jon M. Peha, “Sharing Spectrum Through Spectrum Policy Reform and
Cognitive Radio,” in Proc. of the IEEE ’09, 97 (4), pp. 708-719, 2009.
[17] E. Hossain, D. Niyato and Z. Han, Dynamic spectrum access and
management in cognitive radio networks, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
[18] A. Tonmukayakul and M. B. H. Weiss, “A study of secondary spectrum
use using agent-based computational economics,” Economic Research and
Electronic Networking (NETNOMICS), 2009.
[19] C. Kloeck, H. Jaekel, and F.K. Jondral, “Dynamic and Local Combined
Pricing, Allocation and Billing System with Cognitive Radios,” In Proc.
IEEE DySPAN, 2005.
[20] F. Wang, M. Krunz, and S. Cui, “Price-based spectrum management in
cognitive radio networks,” IEEE J. Selected Topics Signal Proc., 2008.
[21] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Market-equilibrium, competitive, and coop-
erative pricing for spectrumsharing in cognitive radio networks: analysis
and comparison,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Comm., 2008.
[22] L. Gao, Xinbing Wang, Y. Xu and Q. Zhang, “Spectrum Trading in
Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach,”
IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm., 2010.
[23] D.M. Kalathil and R. Jain, “Spectrum Sharing through Contracts,” in
Proc. of IEEE DySPAN ’10, pp. 1-9, 2010.
[24] J. Huang, R. Berry and M. L. Honig, “Auction-based Spectrum Sharing,”
ACM Mobile Networks and Applications Journal, 11(3), June 2006.
[25] Xiang-Yang Li, Ping Xu, ShaoJie Tang, Xiaowen Chu,“Spectrum Bid-
ding in Wireless Networks and Related,” in Proc. of COCOON ’08, 2008.
[26] S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, etc., “A general framework for
wireless spectrum auctions,” In Proc. of IEEE DySPAN ’07, 2007.
[27] L. Gao, Y. Xu, X. Wang, “MAP: Multi-Auctioneer Progressive Auction
in Dynamic Spectrum Access,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Computing, 2010.
[28] X. Zhou, S. Gandhi, S. Suri, and H. Zheng, “eBay in the sky: Strategy-
proof wireless spectrum auctions,” in Proc. of ACM MobiCom ’08, 2008.
[29] X. Zhou, H. Zheng, “TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double
Spectrum Auctions,” in Proc. of IEEE InfoCom ’09, 2009.
[30] S. Wang, P. Xu, X. Xu, S.-J. Tang, X.-Y. Li and X. Liu, “TODA: Truthful
Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks,”
Proc. IEEE DySPAN, 2010.
[31] O. Simeone, I. Stanojev, S. Savazzi, Y. Bar-Ness, U. Spagnolini, R.
Pickholtz, “Spectrum leasing to cooperating ad hoc secondary networks,”
IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 203-213, Jan. 2008.
[32] J. Zhang and Q. Zhang, “Stackelberg Game for Utility-Based Coopera-
tive Cognitive Radio Networks,” in Proc. ACM Mobihoc 09, 2009.
[33] H. Wang, L. Gao, X. Gan, Xinbing Wang, E. Hossain, “Cooperative
Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Game-Theoretic
Approach,” to appear in Proc. of IEEE ICC ’10, South Africa, 2010.
[34] Y. Han, A. Pandharipande and S.H. Ting, “Cooperative spectrum sharing
via controlled amplify-and-forward relaying,” in Proc. of IEEE PIMRC
’08, pp. 1–5, 2008.
[35] H. Shen and T. Basar, “Pricing under information asymmetry for a large
population of users,” Telecommunication System, May 2010.
[36] J. N. Laneman, and G. W. Wornell, “Distributed space-time-coded
protocols for exploiting cooperative diversity in wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. on Information Theory, Oct. 2003, 49(10), 2415-2425.
[37] J. Luo, R. Blum, L. Cimini, L. Greenstein and A. Haimovich, “Decode-
and-forward cooperative diversity with power allocation in wireless
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Comm., 2007, 6, 793-799.
[38] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991.
[39] P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory, The MIT Press, 2005.
[40] A. Ruszczynski, Nonlinear Optimization, Princeton Univ. Press, 2006.
